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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
The recent decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should pro-
mote no major changes in the area of federal practice and procedure. In the
past term, the court interpreted several federal rules, made some clarifica-
tions in the area of jurisdiction, and demonstrated that it will closely super-
vise the discretionary actions of the federal district courts. This article
presents a survey of the court's most significant decisions in the field.
I. TRIAL COURT SUPERVISION
The most important decisions of the Tenth Circuit in this area per-
tained to the appellate court's supervision of the activity of the district
courts. Specifically, the court addressed the appropriateness of a writ of
mandamus as a tool to supervise the district courts' discretion, the proper
scope of a pre-trial order, and the abdication of judicial responsibility
through verbatim adoption of one party's findings of fact or via an unwar-
ranted reference to a special master.
A. Review under Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
There are three method§ of obtaining appellate review. The most com-
mon approach is an appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1291.1 This route, how-
ever, is restricted to "final orders" of the district court 2 and precludes appeal
which is "tentative, informal or incomplete."' 3 The purpose of this rule is to
avoid piecemeal review.
4
The second method of review is through an appeal under 28 U.S.C.
section 1292(b). 5 This method allows for the appeal of orders, not final for
purposes of section 1291, which the district court is willing to certify for ap-
peal.
6
The third, a seldom used procedure for appellate review, is through a
writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act.7 The Supreme Court has made
it clear that mandamus is not a substitute for the appeal procedure under
section 1291 or section 1292(b).8 It is an extraordinary writ and will only be
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
2. Id.
3. Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
4. Id. Lack of jurisdiction is an exception to the "final order" rule. Daiflon, Inc. v. Boha-
non, 612 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'don othergrounds, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17,
1980) (No. 79-1895).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See FED. R. App. P. 21(a).
6. The district judge may certify an order for appeal if he is of the opinion that there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially ad-
vance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). See FED. R. APP. P. 21(a).
8. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). See also Daiflon, Inc. v. Boha-
non, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (No. 79-1895).
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granted when the petitioner has established that his right to the writ is "clear
and indisputable"9 and that the district court's action was so extraordinary
that it evidenced arbitrariness and clear abuse of discretion.10
The Tenth Circuit was petitioned for a writ of mandamus in State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Scho/es1 and in Dazfton, Inc. v. Bohanon. 12 In the
former case, the petition was denied; in the latter case it was granted in part.
In Scholes, State Farm Insurance Company appealed from the district
court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment action. State Farm was seeking
a judicial declaration relieving it of any further obligation to defend Scholes,
an insured of State Farm, on the grounds that Scholes had violated various
clauses in the insurance contract. 13 The district court ordered the action
dismissed without prejudice pending state proceedings which involved the
same parties, the same facts and identical issues. 14 For purposes of review,
the court of appeals treated the dismissal without prejudice as the equivalent
of a stay of proceedings.
15
As a preliminary matter, the court of appeals stated that an appeal
under section 1291 was not the proper procedure for review in this case.
While certain appellate courts have held otherwise, 16 the Tenth Circuit
stated that the district court's decision to stay the proceedings was not a
"final order" for purposes of appellate jurisdiction and that mandamus
would be the appropriate remedy.17 Despite this procedural defect, the cir-
cuit court was willing to treat State Farm's "appeal" as an "application for
leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to the All Writs
Act." 8 This act of benevolence proved to be illusory, however, as the court
went on to deny State Farm's application, stating that "the district court was
clearly justified in staying proceedings before it pending final determination
.. .in state court." 19
9. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662 (1978); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953).
10. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
11. 601 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1979).
12. 612 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (No. 79-
1895).
13. 601 F.2d at 1153.
14. Id.
15. The district court stated that "[tlhe practical effect of such a stay [of proceedings]
would be indistinguishable from a dismissal without prejudice in this case." Id at 1155 (quot-
ing the district court's opinion). The majority did not address this distinction because it was not
raised by the parties. Id at 1156 n.3. judge Logan, in his concurrence, disagreed. A dismissal
without prejudice is different from a stay of proceedings; a stay eliminates any statute of limita-
tions problem and "leaves the judge free to reconsider his decision to defer or to take other
action." Id at 1156 (Logan, J., concurring).
16. See Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.
1976); Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc);
Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (lst Cir. 1972).
17. 601 F.2d at 1154 (citing Pet Milk Co. v. Ritter, 323 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1963)). It
is questionable whether this classification had any effect on the outcome of the case. Judge
Logan believed that an appeal was the proper procedure since he treated the dismissal without
prejudice as a "final order", yet he still agreed with the result reached by the majority. Id. at
1156 (Logan, J., concurring).
18. 601 F.2d at 1154.
19. Id at 1155.
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The circuit court relied on W1/I v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,20 wherein the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is . . . well settled that a dis-
trict court is 'under no compulsion to exercise [its] jurisdiction' ",21 and that
the decision to stay proceedings is "largely committed to the 'carefully con-
sidered judgment' . . . of the district court."'22 Based on this authority,
Judge Barrett, writing for the circuit court's majority, went on to hold that
State Farm's right to have its declaratory judgment action heard was not
"clear and indisputable. '2 3 On the contrary, the district court was clearly
justified in its actions because simultaneous prosecution of the case in state
and federal court would result in wasteful duplication of counsel, courts, liti-
gants and witnesses.
2 4
Da/ion, Inc. v. Bohanon25 was an antitrust action in the District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma. The jury returned a verdict of $2.5 mil-
lion in favor of the plaintiff Daiflon. The trial judge denied the defendant's
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Instead, the judge va-
cated the jury verdict and granted a new trial on all issues.2 6 The trial judge
appeared to have based his ruling on the excessive award of damages and on
the wrongful admission of unidentified exhibits into evidence. 27 Daiflon pe-
titioned the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus 28 to prohibit any fur-
ther proceedings except as necessary to enter judgment on the verdict.
29
The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Doyle, acknowledged that there are
only three circuit court cases in which mandamus has been invoked to re-
view a lower court's order for a new trial. 30 Despite this sparse precedent,
Judge Doyle held that mandamus would be proper when
there is a disregard for proper procedure, or misuse of judicial
power in the trial [court constituting] a clear abuse of discretion. If
it is found that there was a plain or clear error in the judge's evalu-
ation of the facts and that the granting of the new trial was gross or
excessive to the extent that it is extraordinary, it would seem that
20. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
21. Id at 662 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942)).
22. Id at 663 (quoting Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 818 (1976)).
23. 601 F.2d at 1155.
24. Id. The stay was further justified because the state court obtained jurisdiction long
before the federal court did, no issue of federal law was involved, and the state action would
resolve all of the issues arising out of the transaction. Id.
25. 612 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (No. 79-
1895).
26. Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 72-483-B (W.D. Okla. 1979) (attached as Ex-
hibit A to Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d at 1261). Although the district court did not
formally vacate the judgment, the court of appeals felt that this was a mere "oversight".
Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d at 1252.
27. 612 F.2d at 1252.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976); FED. R. App. P. 21(a).
29. 612 F.2d at 1251. An order granting a new trial is not a "final order" for § 1291
purposes. Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 1952), cet. dened, 344 U.S.
921 (1953).
30. 612 F.2d at 1257. See Peterman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 493 F.2d 88
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.




vacating the order granting the new trial would be permissible.
3 1
Using this standard, the circuit court went on to grant supervisory manda-
mus on the issue of liability but declined to vacate the trial court's order as
to damages. 32 The circuit court's reason for granting mandamus on the is-
sue of liability was that the trial judge offered no "rational basis" for vacat-
ing the verdict as to liability of respondent. 33 Ordering a new trial on
liability invaded the province of the jury and denied the piainti1s seventh
amendment rights.
34
On the issue of damages, however, the court of appeals was less willing
to interfere. Since the trial court heard the evidence in its entirety, it was in
a better position to judge this issue. "[S]ubject only to the limitation of the
Seventh Amendment the trial court's discretion is most full and complete
when the court is considering a factual question such as damages." 35 Thus,
even though the court of appeals was not necessarily in agreement with the
trial court's determination, 36 the appeals court was unwilling to vacate that
section of the trial court's order granting a new trial on the issue of damages.
Daifon is notable because it is only the fourth case wherein a federal
appeals court agreed to issue a writ of mandamus to review a lower court's
order granting a new trial. The case is also important for sharpening the
distinction between liability and damages with regard to the scope of the
trial court's discretion. The court implied that mandamus will seldom, if
ever, be issued in the latter case. On the issue of liability, however, the court
of appeals will be less inclined to defer to the trial court's discretion. In
summary, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that it will supervise the lower
courts, by extraordinary writs if necessary, to ensure against any abuse of
discretion.
B. Adherence to .Pre- Trial Orders
In Truj'llo v. Uniroyal Corp. ,37 the district court rejected tendered evi-
dence and jury instructions on the grounds that they deviated from the pre-
trial order. 38 The action was a strict liability claim against Uniroyal for the
manufacture and sale of a tire which caused injury to the plaintiff when it
exploded during mounting. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's in-
jury was caused by his own misuse in attempting to mount a 16-inch tire on
a 16.5-inch rim.39 The pre-trial order which set out the plaintiffs claim
stated that the tire was defective and that Uniroyal was liable under the rule
of strict liability.4° Shortly before trial the defendant learned that the plain-
31. 612 F.2d at 1255.
32. Id at 1260.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 1259.
36. Id at 1260. The circuit court referred to possible misconceptions by the trial judge of
some of the facts related to damages.
37. 608 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1979).
38. Id at 816.
39. The plaintiff testified that he thought he was working with a 16-inch rim. Id at 817.
40. New Mexico has adopted the rule of strict liability as set out in Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A (1965). Se Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 1978).
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tiff planned to base liability on a "failure to warn" theory. The defendant
claimed that the plaintiff was trying to change the theory of the case and
deviate from the pre-trial order.41 The trial court agreed and excluded the
proffered evidence on that issue. The jury found for the defendant.
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge McKay, stated that if par-
ties deviate from a properly drawn pre-trial order, the trial court may ex-
clude the evidence. 42 A proper pre-trial order is one that sharpens and.
simplifies the issues and represents a complete statement of the parties'
claims. 43 If, however, "an adverse party is content with a boilerplate pretrial
order, it cannot later demand that the trial court enforce it as though it were
a specific and meaningful narrowing of the issues." '44 Since the "rule of strict
liability" in New Mexico includes the lack of adequate warning, the court of
appeals correctly found that the evidence relating to that issue could not be
excluded.
4 5
The case is important in two respects. First, the court announced a
judicial policy that procedural devices are to be liberally construed in order
to avoid dismissing otherwise meritorious lawsuits on technicalities. 46 This
rule of construction is to apply to all pretrial procedural tools and not just to
the pleadings. 47 Second, the case is yet another example of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's willingness and determination to supervise its district courts.
C. Findings of Fact
The mechanical adoption of one litigant's proposed findings of fact
without adequate evidentiary support is an abdication of the judicial func-
tion. This was the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Ramey Construction Co. o.
Apache Tribe.48 The trial court in Ramey adopted verbatim the defendant's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without citation to any legal
authority.
49
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the trial judge
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. This rule has two purposes.
First, the procedure fosters care on the part of the trial judge "in considering
41. 608 F.2d at 817. Strict liability in New Mexico includes liability for failure to warn.
See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977). Therefore, it is unclear why the
defendant felt that this was a change of theory unless prior communications between the parties
had led defendants to believe that the plaintiffs were limiting their claim to the manufacturing
or design aspects of strict liability. The court of appeals opinion sheds no light on this issue.
42. 608 F.2d at 817, citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Nielson, 448 F.2d 121, 125 (10th
Cir. 1971).
43. See Christenson, The Pre-Trial Order, 29 F.R.D. 362 (1960).
44. 608 F.2d at 818. The court easily distinguished two cases cited by the defendant
wherein the pre-trial orders were specific and narrowly drawn. See Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co.,
548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1977); Rodrigues v. Ripley Indus., Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974).
45. Had the pre-trial order limited the claim to manufacturing or design defects, the dis-
trict court would have been correct in excluding the evidence related to the failure to warn.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Nielson, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1971).
46. 608 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1979).
47. Id
48. 616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980).
49. The only changes by the trial court were in grammar, in the wording (but not sub-
stance) of one conclusion of law, and in a citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the last proposed conclusion of law was dropped as unnecessary. Id at 466.
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and adjudicating the facts in the dispute." °50 Second, it allows for meaning-
ful review in that the appellate court can determine the trial court's "dis-
cerning line for decision."
5 '
The court of appeals stated that the trial court may have performed its
judicial functions; the court could not tell from the record. The trial court
dismissed complex factual allegations and legal theories in a conclusory
manner without citation to authority. 52 Certain issues did not receive even
summary treatment by the trial court. Without explicit reference in the rec-
ord, the court of appeals was unable to determine if the trial court had con-
sidered the issues.
53
The most glaring example of the inadequacy of verbatim adoption was
evidenced by the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's theory of damages.
The trial court adopted a conclusion of law consisting of five reasons for
rejecting the proposed theory; each reason was separated by the phrase
"and/or. '54 Presumably, the defense intended the trial court to accept some
or all of the suggested reasons and then delete the appropriate conjunction.
However, the deletion was not made. "While a court may properly phrase
its conclusions in the alternative, this conclusion as adopted [was] merely
tentative."
55
The court of appeals acknowledged that the trial court should have the
aid of the parties in its decision-making. Reliance on one party's proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law would have been permissible if the
trial court had taken some steps to ensure that it had fulfilled its function.
Specifically, the trial court could have 1) had the parties exchange proposals
and object to the counterproposals with appropriate fact and law refer-
ences, 56 2) annotated the proposals with references to documentary evidence
and testimony,5 7 or 3) heard oral arguments following submission of the pro-
posals to ensure judicial scrutiny. 58 None of these safeguards were em-
ployed.
While the circuit court noted that the trial court did not act in a judi-
cially irresponsible manner,59 it made clear that the verbatim adoption of
50. Id at 466-67 (quoting Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 246, 249 (10th Cir. 1965)).
This procedure also defines what is being decided for purposes of estoppel and res judicata for
future cases. 345 F.2d at 249.
51. Id at 466 (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 940 (10th Cir.
1975), modifwd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 338, cert. ded, 435 U.S. 923 (1977)).
52. Id at 467.
53. There was no reference in the record to Ramey's claim for interest on money which
was admittedly due but improperly retained or to the Tribe's claim of sovereign immunity. Id
at 467-68.
54. Id at 467.
55. Id
56. Id at 468 (citing Heterochemical Corp. v. United States Rubber Co., 368 F.2d 169
(7th Cir. 1966)).
57. Id (citing Schnell v. Allbright-Nell Co., 348 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 934 (1966)).
58. Id (citing Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 514 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1975)).
59. The court of appeals denied plaintiff's request to remand the case to another judge.
Comments by the trial court which the plaintiff felt were indicative of inadequacy were merely
"self-deprecating modesty and, given the volume of evidence, simple realism." Id at 469, 469
n. 7.
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the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law did not fulfill the judi-
cial function. The case was remanded and the trial court was ordered to
make new and significantly more detailed findings to give the court of ap-
peals and the parties a fuller explanation of the basis for the decision.60
D. Reference to Special Master
The Tenth Circuit addressed the propriety of a reference to a Special
Master pursuant to rule 53(b)6 ' in Pohln v. Dun &Bradstreet, Inc.62 The trial
court issued two orders of reference which bestowed extraordinary powers on
the Special Master. The Special Master was empowered to hear evidence,
make findings of fact which would be final, conduct a trial, and recommend
judgment which the trial court promised to follow. 63 The result of these
orders was "to confer upon the Special Master all of the power that the trial
court enjoyed and perhaps more." 64 Following a pre-trial conference, the
Special Master granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
This judgment was confirmed that same day by the trial judge in a one-
sentence ruling.
65
The circuit court, per Judge Doyle, reversed the judgment, stating that
this was a complete abdication of the judicial function. 66 Approval of this
action would "fly in the face of Rule 53(b)" 6 7 which states that reference
"shall be the exception and not the rule." 6 References to a Special Master
will only be approved where exceptional circumstances are shown. 6 9 The
Supreme Court has stated that neither congestion of the docket nor c6mplex-
ity nor length of trial will suffice to warrant a reference. 70 In the instant
case, there were no circumstances that would warrant a reference to a Spe-
cial Master.
7 1
In those cases where exceptional circumstances warrant a reference to a
Special Master, the Master's report is merely evidence which the jury can
disregard. 72 In the instant case, even though a jury trial was contemplated,
60. Id at 469.
61. Rule 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be
tried to a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in
actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computa-
tion of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
62. No. 78-1648 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1980).
63. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
64. Id, slip op. at 3 n.2.
65. Id, slip op. at 1-2.
66. Id, slip op. at 10.
67. Id
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b), supra note 61.
69. Bartlett Collins Co. v. Surinam Navig. Co., 381 F.2d 546, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1967).
70. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1967). The Court, in LaBuy, did
concede that a complex accounting was an element that might permissibly be referred to a
Special Master. Id
71. The appellate court recognized that Judge Barrow, the trial judge, was in failing
health at the time of reference. The proper procedure, however, would have been to transfer
the case to another district judge. No. 78-1648, slip op. at 10.
72. Some commentators suggest that a reference to a Special Master would rarely be ap-
19811
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the Special Master was empowered to make final findings of fact and to
enter a binding judgment. Such an order was not only an abdication of the
judicial function but it also invaded the province of the jury and denied to
the plaintiff his seventh amendment rights.
Through these decisions, the Tenth Circuit has emphasized that it is
going to take the time and effort to supervise the district courts. The court of
appeals will not hesitate to intervene to protect the interests of the parties if
it finds that the trial court abused its discretion.
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit, in Naisbiti v. United States,73 ruled that the federal
courts do not have jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims
arising out of intentional torts committed by government employees. The
plaintiffs, victims of intentional torts committed by two off-duty airmen,
sued the government under the Act and claimed in their suit that the gov-
ernment had been negligent in its supervision of the airmen. The district
court granted the government's motion to dismiss based on section 2680(h)
74
of the Act. Under this section, the government retains its immunity when
the liability claim arises from intentional torts. Immunity is waived in the
Act, however, for negligence claims.
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Doyle, upheld the
district court's dismissal of the claim. 75 The appellate court gave support to
the lower court's interpretation of section 2680(h) which allows a negligence
claim against the government when an intentional tort has been committed
by a non-employee, such as an inmate in a federal prison, whom the govern-
ment has a duty to supervise. This interpretation bars a negligence claim
when the tort has been committed by a government employee. This em-
ployee/non-employee distinction, Judge Doyle noted, was first articulated
by the Second Circuit in Panel/a v. United States76 and has been adopted in
most subsequent decisions.
It is believed that [this distinction] stems from the proposition that
where the employee has committed a tortious intentional act, even
though it is not with the approval of his employer, the government,
nevertheless, he is so closely connected with the government that
the intentional act is imputed to the government. Since the gov-
propriate in a non-jury trial as the Special Master and not the court would in fact decide the
case. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2605
(1971).
73. 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 240 (1980).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) provides that the waiver of immunity shall not apply to
"[alny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights .. "
75. The trial court reasoned that, although based on negligence, the plaintiffs' claims were,
by their character, intentional torts. Where the government is sued for failure to supervise non-
employees, the sole basis of the government's liability is negligent supervision. Here, negligence
was an alternate theory, not the sole basis of the liability claim.
76. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954).
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ernment has waived liability only in negligence cases in accordance
with § 2680(h), an attempt to establish liability on a negligence
basis is indeed an effort to circumvent the retention of immunity
provided in § 2680(h).
77
A strong thread running through a number of cases, Judge Doyle summa-
rized, is a recognition of this governmental immunity when the tortfeasor is a
government employee. The two airmen were government employees; appli-
cation of section 2680(h) therefore barred the plaintiff's claims.7 8
The Tenth Circuit found that federal jurisdiction was present in a de-
claratory judgment action concerning an insurance policy with a $10,000
limit in Farmers Insurance Co. v. McClain.79 The defendants had asserted that,
under 28 U.S.C. section 1332, district courts only have jurisdiction when
"the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest or costs." 80 Because the insurance policy was limited to $10,000,
Farmers claimed that the plaintiff had not met the statutory requirement for
federal court jurisdiction.
Judge McWilliams, writing for the Tenth Circuit, reasoned that the
costs and interest excluded from the jurisdictional amount by the statute
were only those which might be allowed in connection with the federal ac-
tion. Farmers' potential liability, however, would include both the costs of
defending the claim in the state court proceeding and the costs which might
be assessed against the insured. These additional obligations would be con-
sidered part of the maximum limit of Farmers' liability and therefore would
cause the amount in controversy to exceed $10,000. The opinion cited nu-
merous cases which have held that costs incurred or incurrable in state pro-
ceedings could be considered as a part of the amount in controversy for
federal jurisdictional limits.8 ' Farmers' obligations under the policy might
cause the company to incur some expenses in connection with the pending
state court proceeding; thus, the jurisdictional limit was met.
The Tenth Circuit made law out of dictum by holding in Hackney o.
Newman Memonal Hospital, Inc. 82 that the appointment of a fiduciary who has
a substantial beneficial interest in existing litigation is immune from a chal-
lenge for diversity jurisdiction purposes. The plaintiff, a resident of Colo-
rado, was appointed the successor administratrix of her deceased mother's
estate. In this capacity she commenced a wrongful death action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Shortly afterwards, the
plaintiff moved to Oklahoma. The trial court dismissed the wrongful death
action on the grounds that the plaintiff had been appointed administratrix
in violation of 28 U.S.C. section 1359. This "anti-collusion" statute denies
jurisdiction when a party has been "improperly or collusively made or joined
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."'8 3 The trial court's holding was
77. 611 F.2d at 1355.
78. Id. at 1356.
79. 603 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1979).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (emphasis added).
81. 603 F.2d at 823.
82. 621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 397 (1980).
83. "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by
1981]
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based on a finding that the primary purpose of the plaintiff's appointment
was to invoke federal jurisdiction.
In reversing the trial court's dismissal, Judge Logan cited the leading
case of McSparran v. We'st84 wherein the Third Circuit had construed the
words "improperly or collusively" to prohibit the joinder of "a nominal
party designated simply for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship,
who has no real or substantial interest in the dispute or controversy."85' The
courts, following the McSparran interpretation of section 1359, have found
the appointment of "straw parties" as fiduciaries solely for the purpose of
gaining diversity jurisdiction to be collusive but have implied in dictum that
collusion would not be present if the appointee had a substantial relation-
ship to the litigation.
Declaring that the "instant case tests the dictum," 8 6 Judge Logan, writ-
ing for the appellate court, reasoned that the plaintiff, a beneficiary entitled
to a portion of the proceeds from the wrongful death action, had a real,
substantial stake in the litigation. Thus, she was not a straw party collu-
sively and improperly appointed. The challe*nge to her appointment failed
and the district court was deemed to have jurisdiction to hear the suit that
the plaintiff had commenced. Chief Judge Seth, in concurrence, noted that
the "primary purpose" test used by the trial court does not apply the "im-
proper and collusive" statutory standard. While motive and intent are ele-
ments to be considered in a determination of the collusive and improper




The minimum contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washingtona
was cited in two Tenth Circuit cases involving personal jurisdiction.
Schreiber v. Alhs-Chalmers Corp. 8 9 involved the transfer of a products lia-
bility action from a Mississippi to a Kansas federal district court. The plain-
tiff, a citizen of Kansas, had been injured in Kansas while working on a roto-
baler manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiff brought suit in Mississippi,
basing federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The defendant, a
Delaware corporation headquartered in Wisconsin and qualified to do busi-
ness in Mississippi for many years, sought a change of venue to Kansas. The
case was transferred to the Kansas federal district court which was bound, as
the transferee court, to apply the state law of the transferor court.90 The
assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the juris-
diction of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976).
84. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
85. 402 F.2d at 873.
86. 621 F.2d at 1071.
87. Id.
88. "It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of
the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play
and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has in-
curred there." 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
89. 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 371 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
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Kansas district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on alter-
nate theories. The trial court first held that the Mississippi court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case because the Mississippi statute violated
federal due process. The statute provided that a foreign corporation doing
business in Mississippi is subject to suit regardless of where the cause of ac-
tion accrued. 9 1 In the alternative, the trial court asserted that if the Missis-
sippi court did have jurisdiction, the action was barred by Kansas' two-year
statute of limitations for tort and warranty claims.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, per Judge McWilliams, reversed the
summary judgment order, finding that the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Mississippi court did not offend federal due process. The court of appeals
cited a Ninth Circuit decision 92 which had reviewed the authorities on the
minimum contacts requirement and had concluded that if a foreign corpora-
tion's activities in the forum state are "continuous and systematic," it could
be served in causes of action unconnected to forum activities. In answer to
the trial court's contention that jurisdiction was prohibited due to the recent
Supreme Court ruling in Shaffer v. Henner,93 the court of appeals distin-
guished the quasi-in-rem action in that case from the personal jurisdiction
question of the instant case, noting that the Court in Shaffer had held that
jurisdiction could be maintained in a state court proceeding if the minimum
contacts standard of International Shoe had been met.94 Allis-Chalmers had
been conducting continuous and systematic, although limited, parts of its
general business in Mississippi. Therefore, the state statute authorizing juris-
diction over such a foreign corporation when the cause of action had accrued
in another state did not violate federal due process standards. Furthermore,
the court held that Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations for tort and
warranty claims would control because the Kansas federal court was obli-
gated to follow Mississippi law as it presently existed.
95
Minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction were found lacking in Burke v. Tom McCall & Associates.96 The
plaintiff, a resident of New Mexico, brought suit in New Mexico federal dis-
trict court against California and Texas employment agencies, alleging age
discrimination under a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967. 9 7 The defendants, both of whom had been contacted by the
plaintiff by mail, filed motions to dismiss claiming a lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. Neither firm conducted business in New Mexico nor contacted any
potential employers in the state on the plaintiffs behalf. The trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
On appeal, Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the
91. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-1-27 (1972). The trial court felt that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977), prohibited a state from opening its courts to a proceeding against a foreign
corporation when the cause of action accrued from events arising in another state.
92. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
93. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
94. 611 F.2d at 794.
95. Id
96. No. 79-1145 (10th Cir. Aug. 21, 1979).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
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trial court's finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the cause of
action arose under a federal law, the federal standard for jurisdiction set out
in International Shoe Co. was applicable. "Under International Shoe Co. it is nec-
essary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant had substantial
contact with the state."9 8 Because there had been no transaction of business
by either defendant in New Mexico, neither fairness nor due process would
permit personal jurisdiction to attach by tie unere receipt of a i ttr.
C. Appellate Jurzsdiction
The Tenth Circuit restricted appellate jurisdiction in class action suits
in Bowe v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors99 by holding that dismissal of a
complaint for failure to prosecute does not permit appellate review of a trial
court's order denying certification of the class action. The plaintiff in Bowe
filed a class action suit alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange
Act, 10 0 the Colorado Securities Act' 0 ' and fraud. The district court denied
the motion for certification of the class action and the plaintiff appealed. In
dismissing the appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that the order denying
certification did not constitute a final judgment subject to review nor did it
satisfy the "death knell"' 0 2 or collateral order 10 3 exceptions to 28 U.S.C.
section 1291,104 the final judgment rule. On remand, the plaintiff again
sought, but failed, to obtain class certification. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's individual complaint for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff once
again appealed to the Tenth Circuit, alleging that the dismissal of her com-
plaint constituted a final judgment, making the lower court's order denying
certification reviewable on appeal.'
0 5
Judge Doyle, writing for the court, agreed that the dismissal for failure
to prosecute was a final judgment. However, the matter to be reviewed on
appeal was the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and not the order de-
nying class certification.' 0 6 Judge Doyle asserted that review of a decertifi-
cation order, which is interlocutory in nature, would conflict with the Livesay
doctrine. In Livesay,'0 7 the Supreme Court held that a district court's pre-
98. No. 79-1145, slip op. at 5.
99. 613 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1980).
100. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78jij(c) (Supp. III 1979).
101. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (1973).
102. The "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule allowed the appeal of an order
denying class certification if such order was likely to sound the "death knell" of the litigation.
This would occur when a plaintiff seeking representative status would find it economically diffi-
cult, without the incentive of a potential group recovery, to pursue his complaint to final judg-
ment; such a plaintiff could seek appellate review of the denial of class certification. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cerl. dented, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
103. In order to qualify for the collateral order exception, enunciated in Cohen v. Benefrt7t
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), an interlocutory order must determine conclusively the
disputed question, it must resolve an issue which is separate from the merits of the claim, and it
must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
104. "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . . except where. a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
105. 613 F.2d at 799.
106. Id
107. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
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judgment order denying certification of a class action was not appealable
under the final judgment rule of section 1291. The Supreme Court opinion
ended the circuit courts' use of the "death knell" exception, by which parties
denied class certification could obtain appellate review if the order was likely
to sound the "death knell" for the litigation. The Supreme Court opposed
further use of the exception because the "death knell" doctrine authorized
indiscriminate interlocutory review of decisions made by the trial judge and
"defeat[ed] one vital purpose of the final-judgment rule-'that of maintain-
ing the appropriate relationship between the respective courts.' "108
The claim of the class representative in the Bowe case, Judge Doyle con-
cluded, was not distinguishable from the claim in Livesay. To permit appel-
late review of the order denying certification merely because the plaintiff's
individual complaint had been dismissed for failure to prosecute would cir-
cumvent the clear mandate of Livesay. Judge Doyle reasoned that any plain-
tiff desirous of appellate review could simply allow dismissal of his claim for
class representation on the grounds of failure to prosecute. If review of the
dismissal included review of the order denying certification, an intolerable
loophole to Liwesay would be created.
Judge Doyle noted that the Ninth Circuit had reached a similar conclu-
sion in Huey v. Teledyne, Inc. 109 He recognized the hardship which strict ap-
plication of this rule would place on plaintiffs for whom denial of class action
review terminated the litigation. Nonetheless, the Livesay doctrine, which
represents further difficulties for plaintiffs seeking class action representa-
tion,i 1o compelled the Tenth Circuit court to conclude that they were with-
out authority to review "the class issue .... at this preliminary stage . . .
notwithstanding that the individual case of the class representative stands
dismissed." I I I
An appeal cannot be taken from a federal magistrate's order for entry of
a final judgment, the Tenth Circuit held in the per curam decision of Harding
v. Kurco, Inc. 112 The district court had ordered consolidated actions brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and referred them to the United States
Magistrate for trial. The parties, pursuant to the district court's local rule
17(a), which required that stipulations for trial to a magistrate include re-
view procedures, stipulated that the magistrate's judgment would be final
and directly appealable to the court of appeals. Following the trial, the de-
fendants appealed from the judgment which was entered for the plaintiffs on
the magistrate's direction and order.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tenth Circuit court cited the Federal
Magistrates Act, which authorizes the assignment to a magistrate of only
those additional duties that are not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States. The district judge retains supervisory power over
the magistrate's decisions and is ultimately responsible for that decision.
108. Id. at 476.
109. 608 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979).
110. See also Comment, FederalJurisdzction--Cass Action---Orders Relating to Class Certifratiwn
Not Appealable Under 28 USC § 1291 Pror to Fialfjudgment, 49 Miss. L.J. 973 (1978).
111. 613 F.2d at 802.
112. 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979).
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that "the discretionary authority to
direct entry of a final judgment is a fundamental and exclusive power of an
Article III judge."'" 3 The magistrate's order was vacated and the appeal
dismissed without prejudice so that district court review would be facilitated.
An appeal from a district court judgment interpreting oil and gas pric-
ing regulations promulgated by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA)
was dismissed by the Tenth Circuit for iack ofjuridiction, in ahL,,ana Asso-
ciation of Energy Consumers & Producers v. FEA. 114 The plaintiff association
asserted that the issue before the trial court was FEA adherence to proper
procedures in the promulgation of regulations, thus giving the circuit court
jurisdiction over the appeal. The government moved to dismiss the appeal,
contending that the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) had
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in this matter.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tenth Circuit established that the district
court's jurisdiction was based on the provisions of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act. The Supreme Court, in Bray v. Uniied States," 5 held that all ap-
peals arising under this Act were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
TECA. The trial court's determination dealt with "exactly the types of reg-
ulations on oil and gas pricing . ..that the TECA was established to han-
dle."' 16 The court of appeals rejected a Second Circuit opinion"t 7 allowing
a bifurcated appeal to both a circuit court and to the TECA, declaring that
"[t]here is little to be gained. . . other than mass confusion, by the promot-
ing of simultaneous circuit-court-TECA appeals."
'" 8
As the question of ripeness affects subject matter jurisdiction, the court
may raise the issue sua sponte at any time, the Tenth Circuit ruled in their
denial of jurisdiction in In re GrandJug, Apri, 1979.119 A federal grand jury
had issued subpoenas duces tecum to the defendant. While motions to
quash the subpoenas were being heard, the grand jury indicted the defend-
ant. The government then applied for issuance of pre-trial subpoenas, re-
questing the same documents sought by the grand jury. The district court
had not ruled upon the government's application for pre-trial subpoenas at
the time of this government appeal from a lower court ruling which partly
sustained and partly overruled the motions to quash the grand jury subpoe-
nas.
The defendant argued, on appeal, that the grand jury's indictment,
which came without the grand jury first obtaining the requested documents,
mooted the subpoena issue. The government, however, contended that it
had applied for issuance of pre-trial subpoenas and believed that the defend-
ants would raise the same defenses to their subpoenas as were raised to the
enforcement of the grand jury subpoenas. Thus, the government asserted
113. Id. at 814.
114. No. 79-1847 (10th Cir., Oct. 23, 1979).
115. 423 U.S. 73, 74 (1975).
116. No. 79-1847, slip op. at 4.
117. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., No. 79-7330 (2d Cir.,
Aug. 1, 1979).
118. No. 79-1847, slip op. at 5.
119. 604 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1979).
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that the issues presented were "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
120
Judge Barrett's Tenth Circuit opinion rejected both of these arguments,
but he dismissed the appeal for want of ripeness, an issue which the court
of appeals may raise voluntarily because it affects the court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The court declined to issue an advisory opinion on the
propriety of the government's subpoena applications, declaring that "it is
preferable to defer decision of the constitutional issues raised until there is an
actual, concrete need to decide them."' 12 1 Although the appellate court rec-
ognized that the defendants were likely to raise the same defenses to the
government's subpoenas when issued, the court decided to delay resolution
of the question until a time closer to the disputed event.
D. Removal Jurisdiction
Parties who seek removal to federal court are not estopped from chal-
lenging that court's jurisdiction on appeal, the Tenth Circuit ruled in Hudson
v. Smith.' 2 2 The district court, however, had the authority to remand a sepa-
rate and independent claim while retaining a non-removable cause of action.
In Hudson, the plaintiff, assignee of a third party's interest in a corpora-
tion, brought suit in Oklahoma state court. The first claim sought damages
for breach of contract; the second claim sought dissolution of the corporation
formed by the contract under an Oklahoma statute which provided for dis-
solution when there was a deadlock in corporate ownership. The state court
granted the defendant's petition for removal to federal district court; the
plaintiff then moved to remand the action to the state court. The federal
district court remanded the claim for dissolution to state court but retained
the breach of contract claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441.123 This
statute gives the district court the discretion either to try or to remand sepa-
rate and independent causes of action which have been joined with non-
removable claims. Trial on the breach of contract claim resulted in a jury
verdict for the plaintiffs. Defendants appealed, claiming that the federal dis-
trict court to which they sought removal now lacked jurisdiction. Defend-
ants charged that both causes of action should have been remanded to the
state court.
Judge McWilliams' opinion rejected the argument that a party who pe-
titions for removal to a federal court and then loses his case in that court is
estopped from seeking remand to a state court. The decision rested on the
authority of American Fire &Casualty Co. v. Finn.'2 4 Instead, the judge looked
to the provisions of section 1441 (c) to determine if the plaintiff's two causes
120. Id. at 72.
121. Id.
122. 618 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1980).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be re-
movable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
124. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
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of action were separate and independent, thus giving the district court dis-
cretionary authority to remand the dissolution claim but retain the breach of
contract action. In determining that the two claims were indeed separate
and independent, the appellate court reasoned that the outcome of the
breach of contract claim would not affect the question of whether the corpo-
ration's ownership was deadlocked. Because the dissolution action would be
pursued regardless of who prevailed in the contract claim, the trial court
properly held that the two claims were separate and independent and prop-
erly retained the contract claim.
III. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Rule 15(b)-Amendments to Conform to the Evidence
In In re Santa Fe Downs, Inc.,125 the Tenth Circuit declared that under
the minimum procedural requirements of rule 15(b), a plaintiWs suit may be
dismissed from court when the pleadings contain an incorrect statutory cita-
tion. 126 This is particularly true when the plaintiff's legal theory is reliant
upon the statute miscited.'
2 7
In the original complaint, the trustee of the bankrupt, Santa Fe Downs,
claimed that defendants' mortgages were void under a section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act unrelated to consensual liens.' 28 Therefore a showing of the
lienholders' knowledge of the insolvency was not required. The court,
through Judge McKay, declared that defendant mortgagees properly ob-
jected when Santa Fe Downs' trustee sought to introduce evidence of the
mortgagees' knowledge of insolvency.
129
The deficiencies in the trustee's complaint were repeatedly noted. Be-
cause the trustee failed to amend the pleadings, and because rule 15(b)
makes no provision for automatic amendment when proper objections are
made to the admission of evidence,' 30 the Tenth Circuit determined that the
bankruptcy court committed reversible error in refusing the mortgagees' mo-
tion for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiffs presentation of evidence
failed to show a right to relief.13 1 Underlying the appellate court's determi-
nation in the case was its recognition that while the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may have abolished full fact pleading, the rules must accommo-
125. 611 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. Id at 816.
127. Id
128. The trustee's complaint stated that the suit was brought to declare liens null and void
pursuant to § 67(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, I I U.S.C. § 107(a)(1) (1976), (current version at
I I U.S.C. §§ 349(b), 457(b), (d), 551 (Supp. III 1979)), which is directed at liens obtained by
attachment, judgment, levy, or other equitable process or proceedings. 611 F.2d at 816.
129. 611 F.2d at 816.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b), in relevant part, reads:
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made
by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the objecting party ofails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the ments.
(emphasis added).
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
[Vol. 58:2
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
date a defendant by requiring that he be given some notice of the case
against him. 132 Therefore, plaintiff's error in citation of a statute essential to
the claim for relief was more than a mere technical error. Dismissal of the
suit during the trial would not have constituted the tyranny of formalism
which rule 15(b) seeks to prevent.
133
B. Rule 56--Summay Judgment
St. Loui's Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC134 provided the Tenth Circuit with
an opportunity to reiterate that, in considering a motion for summary judg-
ment, a district court may take judicial notice sua sponte of its own records
and the records of other courts-if called to the court's attention by the par-
ties-to determine the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 135 The
appeal arose from the Colorado District Court's entry of summary judgment
for the defendant FDIC in an action brought by St. Louis Baptist Temple,
Inc. (Temple). Temple challenged the validity of a sheriff's sale in satisfac-
tion of a judgment debt. The judgment had been rendered against Soldiers
of the Cross, Inc. (Soldiers) and Goff Memorial Library (Goff), which Tem-
ple alleged to be its predecessors in title. The suit, originally brought in the
district court of Jefferson County, Colorado, was removed to the federal dis-
trict court by the FDIC. It challenged the validity of the sale for insuffi-
ciency of publication and inadequacy of the sale price. Temple, on appeal,
contended that the district cou-rt erred in granting summary judgment based
on judicial notice of records from an earlier litigation and appeal involving
the same tract of land.
The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Barrett, reasoned that court records
are verifiable with certainty and may be judicially noticed when brought to
the attention of the court by the parties. 136 The records of the earlier case
and appeal were properly considered by the district court because they were
directly relevant to the determination of the existence of a genuine issue of a
material fact. The prior litigation and affirmance by the Tenth Circuit es-
tablished that Soldiers and Goff were estopped collaterally from attacking
both the judgment and the sheriffs deed, and the related doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel applied against the plaintiff, Temple. Since
the plaintiff was attempting to litigate the same issues "the second time
around, ' ' t 37 utilization of judicial notice, whether requested or not, 138 was
considered especially appropriate.
132. 611 F.2d at 816.
133. Id. at 817.
134. 605 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1980).
135. See Ginsberg v. Thomas, 170 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1948).
136. 605 F.2d at 1172.
137. In its memorandum opinion in civil action no. C-4227, the district court noted that
Soldiers, Goff, and the president of Temple, Reverend Bill Beeny, were closely connected in
identity. The court stated that "this is the second time around for defendant's counsel and for
Rev. Bill Beeny who quarterbacked the case for defendants." Id at 1174.
138. Id at 1174-77.
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C. Rule 60(a) -Reef from Judgment or Order-Clerical Mistakes
A district court's inadvertent mistake in ordering a party guilty of civil
contempt to pay $1200 compensatory damages, when evidence indicated
that the figure should have been $12,000, properly fell under the scope of
rule 60(a)'s provision allowing sua sponte correction of errors arising from
ovcrsight or oifiiSS10h, "3 so the Tenth Circuit held in AlliedMaterials Corp. v.
Superior Products Co. 140 The appellant, Superior Products, was found to have
violated a consent decree by making false and misleading representations
about joint sealant which Allied had contracted to provide for construction
of an addition to Stapleton Airport in Denver. Superior Products contended
on appeal that the trial court could not amend its findings on its own mo-
tion. 141
In rejecting Superior Products' contention that the district court's mis-
take triggered the application of rule 52(b), which rule would have required
that the court's amendment be preceded by the parties motion for amend-
ment, the Tenth Circuit court defined the following boundary between the
rules under discussion: rule 52(b) will apply if the court intended to say, write,
or record the words which are the subject of the amendment and later finds
them to be wrong; rule 60(a) will apply if the error in speech, writing, or
recordation was not what the court intended.' 4 2 The mistake involved in
Allied Materials, which the court described as an inadvertent removal of one
zero in the judgment order, was clearly of the rule 60(a) variety. Therefore,
the district court was found to have made no error in correcting the omission
on its own initiative. 143 While the appellee, Allied Materials, prevailed on
the procedural issues involving the federal rules, the court of appeals ac-
cepted Superior Products' contention that the $12,000 compensatory dam-
ages award was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals offered
Allied the choice of an award of $7,000, as the amount of damages supported
by the evidence, or a retrial of the case on the issue of damages.1
44
D. Rule 60(b) -Rehef from Final Judgment Due to Mistake, Inadvertence,
Excusable Neglect, or Newly Discovered Evidence
In a decision upholding a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) mo-
tion' 45 for relief from a default judgment, CI T Corp. v. Allen, 146 the Tenth
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a) reads, in relevant part:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders.
140. 620 F.2d 224 (10th Cir. 1980).
141. Superior argued on appeal that rule 52(b), not rule 60(a), applied. Id. at 225-27. FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(b) states: "Upon motion ofa par made not later than ten days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly." (emphasis added).
142. The court of appeals repeated this distinction as it was set forth in Kelley v. Bank Bldg.
& Equip. Corp., 453 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1972).
143. 620 F.2d at 226.
144. Id. at 226-28.
145. The rule states, in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
[Vol. 58:2
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Circuit extensively quoted prior decisions to emphasize that the grant of a
motion to set aside a judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. The trial court's determination will not be disturbed in the absence of
a showing of abuse.
Defendant Allen had defaulted on two promissory notes secured by us-
ing heavy construction equipment as collateral. Upon Allen's default, the
balance had been accelerated, the equipment had been repossessed by
C.I.T., and, following public sales of the equipment, C.I.T. obtained, by de-
fault, a deficiency judgment against the defendant. Over six weeks after be-
ing served, and some twenty days after the district court's entry of the
default judgment in favor of C.I.T., Allen filed his original answer. Seven
days later, he filed a motion to set aside the default judgment alleging that
his failure to respond was the result of excusable neglect. He also stated that
he had a meritorious defense because the construction equipment was sold
below its fair market value. Subsequently, Allen submitted additional mem-
oranda alleging that C.I.T. had allowed a third party to use the repossessed
equipment prior to sale, that the third party had damaged the equipment,
and that the equipment was sold in damaged condition. Relying on its 1978
decision in In re Stone, 14 7 the Tenth Circuit stated that for a successful mo-
tion to set aside a default judgment under rule 60(b), not only must the
movant demonstrate justifiable grounds such as mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect, but the movant must also show the existence of a
meritorious defense.148 White Allen may have made out a case for excusable
neglect, the Tenth Circuit held that he failed to elaborate the facts as suffi-
ciently as required by In re Stone 149 to permit the trial court to judge whether
the defense would have been meritorious. The court of appeals noted that
Allen's later assertions about third-party da mage to the equipment were
"predicated on rank hearsay."' S° Furthermore, he never asserted that he
was not in default, that C.I.T. repossessed the equipment in an improper
manner, or that C.I.T. acted in excess of its rights conferred under the notes
and security agreements. 15!
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: 1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under rule 59(b); 3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 4) the judgment is void; 5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or 6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For another case dealing with rule 60(b), see notes 163-79 in)fa nd
accompanying text.
146. No. 79-1637 (10th Cir., Dec. 10, 1979).
147. 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978). This case details the law controlling the granting of
motions for relief from default judgments.
148. No. 79-1637, slip op. at 5.
149. 588 F.2d at 1319.
150. No. 79-1637, slip op. at 6-7.
151. Id at 7.
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
E. Rule 60(b)-Modiftcation of Consent Decree
In EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,152 seventeen individual union members
intervened in an unfair employment practices action to seek modification of
the original parties' consent decree. The Tenth Circuit prescribed two chan-
nels through which such a consent decree may be modified. First, rule 60(b)
may be applied to grant reiief when a final judgment is shown to be void,
when it is shown that prospective application would no longer be equitable,
or when there is any other reason justifying relief. Second, the continuing
jurisdiction of equity empowers a court to modify a decree upon a showing
of changed circumstances. 1
5 3
The consent decree agreed upon by the EEOC, various labor unions,
and Safeway altered the seniority system for all of Safeway's employees. The
intervenors argued that the decree did not comport with the purpose of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196415 4 because it discriminated against em-
ployees who had transferred positions before the decree became effective.
155
In dismissing these contentions and affirming the district court's denial of
intervenors' motion for modification, the Tenth Circuit stated that, absent a
showing of abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on a rule 60(b) motion
will not be disturbed, that a consent decree may vary from the statutory
confines of the original action in order to encourage voluntary settlements,
and that rule 60(b) is not designed "to allow Modification of a consent decree
merely because it reaches a result which could not have been forced on the
parties through litigation."' 156 While the appellate court admitted that a
consent decree may be altered upon a showing of changed circumstances
which produce hardship so extreme and unexpected as to make the decree
oppressive, it found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determina-
tion; there was no evidence of substantial change in the facts underlying the
decree and the interpretation of the order.
Finally, in response to the intervenors' assertion that modification of the
decree was compelled by the Supreme Court case of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,' 57 decided after the decree was entered, the Tenth
Circuit cited its 1958 decision of Collins v. City of Wichita' 58 and the Third
Circuit's decision of Maybery v. Maroney.' 59 In Collins, a change in the judi-
cial view of an established rule of law was not deemed to be an extraordinary
circumstance justifying relief under rule 60(b). 1" According to the Third
Circuit in Maybery, the power to alter decrees may not be based merely on
"precedential evolution."' 6 1 Finally, the court in the instant case held that
152. 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979).
153. Id at 799. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), supra note 145.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976).
155. In the court's words: "[Intervenors'] seniority status was adversely affected by the en-
hanced seniority of post-decree transferees, many of whom had no more claim to Title VII
protection than intervenors." 611 F.2d at 798.
156. Id at 800.
157. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
158. 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
159. 558 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1977).
160. 254 F.2d at 839.
161. 558 F.2d at 1164.
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although there may be some situations where a change in the law would
warrant modification of an injunctive decree, under no circumstances would
modification based on judicial clarification be allowed to undo the effects of
past enforcement or to jeopardize the seniority of employees who had trans-
ferred positions in reliance on the decree.
162
IV. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
The Tenth Circuit addressed the unusual situation of a federal court
enjoining a state court proceeding in Brown v. McCormick. 16 3 Three years
after the plaintiff obtained a default judgment in federal court, the defend-
ants sought to relitigate the issues in state proceedings. The plaintiff unsuc-
cessfully defended on the basis of resfud'cata. He then instituted this action
in the federal district court seeking to enjoin the state proceedings under 28
U.S.C. section 2283.'64 The defendants responded with a motion for relief
of judgment under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
16 5
The district court denied the rule 60(b) motion and enjoined the defendants
from proceeding with their action in the state court.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The opinion involved a two-part analysis.
The court had to determine if the earlier default judgment could withstand
a rule 60(b) attack and, if so, whether an injunction was permissible under
28 U.S.C. section 2283. Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary procedure which per-
mits the court to grant relief from its judgment upon a showing of good
cause. ' 66 The rule is not a substitute for appeal but instead concerns matters
which were not raised and considered by the court in reaching its judg-
ment. 1
6 7
As a basis for the rule 60(b) motion, the defendants claimed 1) that the
federal court had lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction; 2) that
they were denied due process by virtue of rule 37 sanctions; 16 3) that the
default judgment was obtained by fraud on the court; and 4) that the default
judgment was in excess of the pleadings.169
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that these conten-
tions were without merit. The claims of lack of personal jurisdiction and
fraud on the court were summarily dismissed.170 The Tenth Circuit found
that subject matter and diversity were addressed and resolved by the trial
162. 611 F.2d at 801.
163. 608 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1979).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) states that "a court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment if the
judgment is void.
166. See 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 60.02 (2d ed. 1979); 7 id. 60.19.
167. See Daily Mirror, Inc. v. New York News, Inc., 533 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 862 (1976).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
169. 608 F.2d at 413.
170. Id at 413, 414.
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court prior to the entry of default judgment 17 and that the rule 37 sanctions
were appropriate in light of the defendant's "dilatory tactics."' 72 Finally,
the default judgment was deemed not to have exceeded the scope of the
complaint. 173
Having found the default judgment to be valid, the appellate court then
det...ed that the injunction. against further state procedings was proper.
The anti-injunction statute1 74 provides that federal courts cannot normally
interfere with state court proceedings. However, an injunction by the fed-
eral court to "protect or effectuate its judgment" is an exception to this gen-
eral rule. 75 The court of appeals, per Chief Judge Seth, found that the
exception applied in this case; resjuedicata and collateral estoppel operated to
preclude relitigation.' 76  The Younger-Buffiman1 77 doctrine of abstention
based on the principle of federalism did not apply as "[nieither Supreme
Court case involved resjuaidata principles or the situation where a party
armed with his valid federal judgment exhausted state appellate review.' 78
The injunction issued by the district court under 28 U.S.C. section 2283
extended to claims not actually litigated in the initial action. Chief Judge
Seth, however, held that this was valid. These claims arose from the same
underlying transaction and as a compulsory counterclaim, they too were
subject to the injunction.' 79 Once it was determined that the prior default
judgment obtained in federal courts was valid and that the state proceedings
sought to relitigate the same issues, the district court was obligated to issue
the injunction. The integrity of the federal judiciary would allow no less.
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Malpractice Actions: Statute Does Not Run Until Claim Accrues
In Zeidler v. United States,180 the conservator of the mentally incompetent
plaintiff brought a malpractice action in 1976 under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' 8 ' Zeidler's conservator alleged that lobotomy operations per-
171. Id. at 413-14. Having been addressed by the district court, these issues were not consid-
ered proper grounds for a rule 60(b) motion.
172. Id at 414.
173. This controversy centered on whether certain grazing lands were part of the Z-Bar-T
Ranch. The district court found that they were because the evidence showed such was the
intent of the parties. Id. at 414-15.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
175. Id
176. 608 F.2d at 416.
177. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975).
178. 608 F.2d at 416. Younger concerned a state criminal prosecution. Harris claimed the
statute under which California was prosecuting him unconstitutionally abridged his freedom of
speech. The Supreme Court declared that the principles of federalism prohibited federal inter-
ference in the state proceeding, barring extraordinary circumstances. Hujinan applied this ra-
tionale in a civil case. However, it was a civil obscenity case with criminal ramifications.
Additionally, Pursue, Ltd. had not exhausted its state remedies, a necessary component under
Younger. Neither case dealt with a situation so clearly covered by the statute.
179. Id The "pending action" exception to this rule only applies when the counterclaim
was the subject of a pending state action when the federal suit was instigated.
180. 601 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1979).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
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formed in 1947 and 1948 by the government to control Zeidler's conduct
while he was a Veterans Administration Hospital patient rendered him in-
competent and should not have been performed. The district court con-
cluded that insanity was a disability for which the statute of limitations
could not be tolled;' 82 therefore, from the face of the complaint, any action
was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to the section of
the Federal Tort Claims Act under which the action had been brought.1
8 3
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the
grounds that the trial court, in rendering a final disposition based on the
pleadings, made the improper assumption that Zeidler's complaint was
based on insanity leading to the automatic running of the statute. Instead,
the appellate tribunal contended, the main thrust of the plaintiff's action
was malpractice, under which claim the statute could have been tolled.'
84
In medical malpractice actions, the claim accrues when the claimant has a
reasonable opportunity to discover the essential elements of a possible cause
of action.' 85 The case was therefore remanded for a determination as to
whether Zeidler knew or should have known that he suffered injury.
Judge Logan, in his dissent, criticized the majority's conclusion based
on the insanity-malpractice dichotomy as a "distinction without a differ-
ence."' 8 6 If Zeidler had been mentally incapacitated before the operation
then the claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations; if the
alleged malpractice had caused the incompetency, then the result would have
been observable by family and friends following the operation and the stat-
ute would have commenced running. As Judge Logan intimated in his dis-
sent, Zeidler is a difficult case contested in the realm of limitations of actions.
The plaintiff seemed to argue that it was a tort to perform the lobotomies,
not that they were negligently done, and that the defendant government
should be judged from hindsight after thirty years of advancements in medi-
cal science. The currency of the standard of judgment would be a logical
foundation supporting the running of the statute of limitations.
B. Vhdicatihg Pub/ic and Private Rights Under Federal Statutes: State Statutes of
Limitlations Do Not Apply
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Marshall v. Intermoun-
182. See Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976), which, according to the trial court, contained the applica-
ble statute of limitations reads:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or
unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.
The administrative claim, required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), was filed and denied. 601 F.2d at
528.
184. The court extensively cited Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977),
where plaintiff was able to bring a malpractice action thirteen years after an operation because
there was a material factual issue as to when the plaintiff had been able to discover the injury.
185. 601 F.2d at 529 n.l, 530 (citing Ciccarone v. United States, 486 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir.
1973)).
186. Id. at 533.
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tarn Electric Co. 187 that when an action is brought by the government to en-
force private as well as public rights, state statutes of limitations will not bar
the action even though no period of limitations is provided in the operative
federal statute. The Secretary of Labor filed the complaint in this case al-
most twenty-six months after an Intermountain employee, Edward
Cavaliere, had been discharged for filing safety-related complaints with In-
termountain. The Secretary's suit, in which the govermimieit sought an in--
junction against future violations of section 11 (c) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (the Act) 188 and reinstatement and backpay for Cavaliere,
was dismissed by the district court on the ground that the action was barred
by Colorado's two-year statute of limitations for federal causes of action.1
89
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the action, the court of ap-
peals noted that a state limitations period will not be applied to an action
brought by the federal government to vindicate pubic rights or pubhc interests
absent a clear showing of contrary congressional intent.'9° Furthermore, the
court stated that there is no suggestion of congressional intent to adopt state
statutes of limitations in the Act itself;' 9 1 and that section I I(c) of the Act is
designed to ensure reporting of violations rather than vindication of private
interests. 92 The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC'93 to find a new rule applicable to cases in which
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate a hybrid of private and public interests; in
Intermountain Electric the original action had been brought to vindicate public
rights but the primary immediate effect would be relief for private individu-
als. Under the new rule, state statutes of limitations are inapplicable even
though the federal statute provides no period of limitations. However, in
situations where the public and private interests are combined, the doctrine
of laches may be applied to protect the defendant against unreasonable de-
lay in the commencement of the action.1
9 4
The Intermountain Electric decision appears to reach a sympathetic con-
clusion in extending indefinitely the period within which the public interest
may be vindicated. However, it does not acknowledge that the equitable
and elastic doctrine of laches fails to protect, in as certain a manner as statu-
tory periods of limitations, the ability of defendants to prepare for trial in the
187. 614 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1980).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976). Subsection I provides that employees may not be dis-
charged or in any way discriminated against for filing a complaint pursuant to the Act or for in
any way exercising rights afforded by the Act. Under subsection 2, provision is made for the
filing of complaints with the Secretary of Labor.
189. CoLO. RE v. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) reads:
Actions under federal statutes. All actions upon a liability created by a federal statute,
other than for a forfeiture or penalty for which actions no period of limitations is
provided in such statute, shall be commenced within two years or the period specified
for comparable actions arising under Colorado law, whichever is longer, after the
cause of action accrues.
190. 614 F.2d at 262.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). The Occidental decision is analyzed and applied by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals as the principal support for the new rule. 614 F.2d at 262-63.
194. 614 F.2d at 263 n.8.
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increasing variety of hybrid situations, such as administrative cases, where
public and private interests are combined.
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